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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY, Ch. 6 (2d ed):
RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION
Herbert Hovenkamp
This book of CASES AND MATERIALS ON INNOVATION AND COMPETITION
POLICY is intended for educational use. The book is free for all to use subject to an
open source license agreement. It differs from IP/antitrust casebooks in that it
considers numerous sources of competition policy in addition to antitrust,
including those that emanate from the intellectual property laws themselves, and
also related issues such as the relationship between market structure and
innovation, the competitive consequences of regulatory rules governing technology
competition such as net neutrality and interconnection, misuse, the first sale
doctrine, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Chapters will be
updated frequently. The author uses this casebook for a three-unit class in
Innovation and Competition Policy taught at the University of Iowa College of
Law and available to first year law students as an elective. The table of contents is
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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS
HERBERT HOVENKAMP
CHAPTER 6 (2d ed)
RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION
ALLIED TUBE & CONDUIT CORP. V. INDIAN HEAD, INC.
486 U.S. 492 (1988)
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court:
Petitioner contends that its efforts to affect the product standardsetting process of a private association are immune from antitrust liability
under the Noerr doctrine primarily because the association's standards are
widely adopted into law by state and local governments. Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)
(“Noerr”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that Noerr immunity did not apply. We affirm.
The National Fire Protection Association (“Association”) is a
private, voluntary organization with more than 31,500 individual and group
members representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized
medicine, firefighters, and government. The Association, among other
things, publishes product standards and codes related to fire protection
through a process known as “consensus standard making.” One of the codes
it publishes is the National Electrical Code (“Code”), which establishes
product and performance requirements for the design and installation of
electrical wiring systems. Revised every three years, the Code is the most
influential electrical code in the nation. A substantial number of state and
local governments routinely adopt the Code into law with little or no
change; private certification laboratories, such as Underwriters
Laboratories, normally will not list and label an electrical product that does
not meet Code standards; many underwriters will refuse to insure structures
that are not built in conformity with the Code; and many electrical
inspectors, contractors, and distributors will not use a product that falls
outside the Code.
Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1939220

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 6, Page 3
Dec. 2012

conduit, the hollow tubing used as a raceway to carry electrical wires
through the walls and floors of buildings. Throughout the relevant period,
the Code permitted using electrical conduit made of steel, and almost all
conduit sold was in fact steel conduit. Starting in 1980, respondent began to
offer plastic conduit made of polyvinyl chloride. Respondent claims its
plastic conduit offers significant competitive advantages over steel conduit,
including pliability, lower installed cost, and lower susceptibility to short
circuiting. In 1980, however, there was also a scientific basis for concern
that, during fires in high-rise buildings, polyvinyl chloride conduit might
burn and emit toxic fumes.
Respondent initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride
conduit as an approved type of electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the
Code. Following approval by one of the Association's professional panels,
this proposal was scheduled for consideration at the 1980 annual meeting,
where it could be adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the members
present. Alarmed that, if approved, respondent's product might pose a
competitive threat to steel conduit, petitioner, the Nation's largest producer
of steel conduit, met to plan strategy with, among others, members of the
steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its independent sales
agents. They collectively agreed to exclude respondent's product from the
1981 Code by packing the upcoming annual meeting with new Association
members whose only function would be to vote against the polyvinyl
chloride proposal.
Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the
Association and to attend the annual meeting to vote against the proposal.
Petitioner alone recruited 155 persons-including employees, executives,
sales agents, the agents' employees, employees from two divisions that did
not sell electrical products, and the wife of a national sales director.
Petitioner and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000 for the
membership, registration, and attendance expenses of these voters. At the
annual meeting, the steel group voters were instructed where to sit and how
and when to vote by group leaders who used walkie-talkies and hand
signals to facilitate communication. Few of the steel group voters had any
of the technical documentation necessary to follow the meeting. None of
them spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the proposal to
approve polyvinyl chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in
opposition, the proposal was rejected and returned to committee by a vote
of 394 to 390. Respondent appealed the membership's vote to the
Association's Board of Directors, but the Board denied the appeal on the
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ground that, although the Association's rules had been circumvented, they
had not been violated.
In October 1981, respondent brought this suit in Federal District
Court, alleging that petitioner and others had unreasonably restrained trade
in the electrical conduit market in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 26
Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1. A bifurcated jury trial began in March
1985. Petitioner conceded that it had conspired with the other steel interests
to exclude respondent's product from the Code and that it had a pecuniary
interest to do so. The jury, instructed under the rule of reason that
respondent carried the burden of showing that the anticompetitive effects of
petitioner's actions outweighed any procompetitive benefits of standard
setting, found petitioner liable. In answers to special interrogatories, the jury
found that petitioner did not violate any rules of the Association and acted,
at least in part, based on a genuine belief that plastic conduit was unsafe,
but that petitioner nonetheless did “subvert” the consensus standard-making
process of the Association. The jury also made special findings that
petitioner's actions had an adverse impact on competition, were not the least
restrictive means of expressing petitioner's opposition to the use of
polyvinyl chloride conduit in the marketplace, and unreasonably restrained
trade in violation of the antitrust laws. The jury then awarded respondent
damages, to be trebled, of $3.8 million for lost profits resulting from the
effect that excluding polyvinyl chloride conduit from the 1981 Code had of
its own force in the marketplace. No damages were awarded for injuries
stemming from the adoption of the 1981 Code by governmental entities.
The District Court then granted a judgment n.o.v. for petitioner,
reasoning that Noerr immunity applied because the Association was “akin
to a legislature” and because petitioner, “by the use of methods consistent
with acceptable standards of political action, genuinely intended to
influence the [Association] with respect to the National Electrical Code, and
to thereby influence the various state and local legislative bodies which
adopt the [Code].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, 30a. The Court of Appeals
reversed, rejecting both the argument that the Association should be treated
as a “quasi-legislative” body because legislatures routinely adopt the Code
and the argument that efforts to influence the Code were immune under
Noerr as indirect attempts to influence state and local governments. Indian
Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1987)
aff'd, 486 U.S. 492 (1988). We granted certiorari to address important issues
regarding the application of Noerr immunity to private standard-setting
associations.
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Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning
government officials are protected from antitrust liability under the doctrine
established by Noerr; Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-672
(1965); and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508 (1972). The scope of this protection depends, however, on the
source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue.
“[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid
governmental action, as opposed to private action,” those urging the
governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the
anticompetitive restraint. Noerr, 365 U.S., at 136; see also Pennington,
supra, 381 U.S. at 671. In addition, where, independent of any government
action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private action, the
restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is “incidental” to a
valid effort to influence governmental action. Noerr, supra, 365 U.S. at 143.
The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of Noerr immunity,
varies with the context and nature of the activity. A publicity campaign
directed at the general public, seeking legislation or executive action, enjoys
antitrust immunity even when the campaign employs unethical and
deceptive methods.. But in less political arenas, unethical and deceptive
practices can constitute abuses of administrative or judicial processes that
may result in antitrust violations.
In this case, the restraint of trade on which liability was predicated
was the Association's exclusion of respondent's product from the Code, and
no damages were imposed for the incorporation of that Code by any
government. The relevant context is thus the standard-setting process of a
private association. Typically, private standard-setting associations, like the
Association in this case, include members having horizontal and vertical
business relations. See generally 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1477, p. 343
(1986) (trade and standard-setting associations routinely treated as
continuing conspiracies of their members). There is no doubt that the
members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain
competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a
serious potential for anticompetitive harm.FN5 See American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982).
Agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to
manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products. Accordingly,
private standard-setting associations have traditionally been objects of
antitrust scrutiny. See, e.g., ibid.; Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam). When, however,
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private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of
objective expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the
standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic
interests in stifling product competition, cf. Hydrolevel, supra, 456 U.S., at
570-73 (noting absence of “meaningful safeguards”), those private
standards can have significant procompetitive advantages. It is this potential
for procompetitive benefits that has led most lower courts to apply rule-ofreason analysis to product standard-setting by private associations.
Given this context, petitioner does not enjoy the immunity accorded
those who merely urge the government to restrain trade. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that the Association cannot be treated as a “quasilegislative” body simply because legislatures routinely adopt the Code the
Association publishes. Whatever de facto authority the Association enjoys,
no official authority has been conferred on it by any government, and the
decisionmaking body of the Association is composed, at least in part, of
persons with economic incentives to restrain trade. See Continental Ore Co.
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-708 (1962). “We
may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that [a government] acts in
the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to
be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.” Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S.
34 (1985). The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental
action and those resulting from private action may not always be obvious.
But where, as here, the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the
public and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial
interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that
the restraint has resulted from private action.
Noerr immunity might still apply, however, if, as petitioner argues,
the exclusion of polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code, and the effect
that exclusion had of its own force in the marketplace, were incidental to a
valid effort to influence governmental action. Petitioner notes that the lion's
share of the anticompetitive effect in this case came from the predictable
adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local
governments. See Indian Head, Inc., 817 F.2d at 939, n. 1. Indeed,
petitioner argues that, because state and local governments rely so heavily
on the Code and lack the resources or technical expertise to second-guess it,
efforts to influence the Association's standard-setting process are the most
effective means of influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit. This
claim to Noerr immunity has some force. The effort to influence
governmental action in this case certainly cannot be characterized as a sham
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given the actual adoption of the 1981 Code into a number of statutes and
local ordinances. Nor can we quarrel with petitioner's contention that, given
the widespread adoption of the Code into law, any effect the 1981 Code had
in the marketplace of its own force was, in the main, incidental to
petitioner's genuine effort to influence governmental action. And, as
petitioner persuasively argues, the claim of Noerr immunity cannot be
dismissed on the ground that the conduct at issue involved no “direct”
petitioning of government officials, for Noerr itself immunized a form of
“indirect” petitioning. See Noerr (immunizing a publicity campaign directed
at the general public on the ground that it was part of an effort to influence
legislative and executive action).
Nonetheless, the validity of petitioner's actions remains an issue. We
cannot agree with petitioner's absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine
immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence
governmental action. If all such conduct were immunized then, for example,
competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long
as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate level for
governmental ratemaking or price supports. Horizontal conspiracies or
boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from
the government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely
intended to influence the government to agree to the conspirators' terms.
Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions
on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry
and spur legislative action. Immunity might even be claimed for
anticompetitive mergers on the theory that they give the merging
corporations added political clout. Nor is it necessarily dispositive that
packing the Association's meeting may have been the most effective means
of securing government action, for one could imagine situations where the
most effective means of influencing government officials is bribery, and we
have never suggested that that kind of attempt to influence the government
merits protection. We thus conclude that the Noerr immunity of
anticompetitive activity intended to influence the government depends not
only on its impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity.
Here petitioner's actions took place within the context of the
standard-setting process of a private association. Having concluded that the
Association is not a “quasi-legislative” body, we reject petitioner's
argument that any efforts to influence the Association must be treated as
efforts to influence a “quasi-legislature” and given the same wide berth
accorded legislative lobbying. That rounding up supporters is an acceptable
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and constitutionally protected method of influencing elections does not
mean that rounding up economically interested persons to set private
standards must also be protected. Nor do we agree with petitioner's
contention that, regardless of the Association's nonlegislative status, the
effort to influence the Code should receive the same wide latitude given
ethically dubious efforts to influence legislative action in the political arena,
see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140-41, simply because the ultimate aim of the effort
to influence the private standard-setting process was (principally) legislative
action. The ultimate aim is not dispositive. A misrepresentation to a court
would not necessarily be entitled to the same antitrust immunity allowed
deceptive practices in the political arena simply because the odds were very
good that the court's decision would be codified-nor for that matter would
misrepresentations made under oath at a legislative committee hearing in
the hopes of spurring legislative action.
What distinguishes this case from Noerr and its progeny is that the
context and nature of petitioner's activity make it the type of commercial
activity that has traditionally had its validity determined by the antitrust
laws themselves. True, in Noerr we immunized conduct that could be
characterized as a conspiracy among railroads to destroy business relations
between truckers and their customers. Noerr, supra, 365 U.S. at 142. But
we noted there:
“There are no specific findings that the railroads attempted
directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers. Moreover,
all the evidence in the record, both oral and documentary, deals with
the railroads' efforts to influence the passage and enforcement of
laws. Circulars, speeches, newspaper articles, editorials, magazine
articles, memoranda and all other documents discuss in one way or
another the railroads' charges that heavy trucks injure the roads,
violate the laws and create traffic hazards, and urge that truckers
should be forced to pay a fair share of the costs of rebuilding the
roads, that they should be compelled to obey the laws, and that
limits should be placed upon the weight of the loads they are
permitted to carry.”
In light of those findings, we characterized the railroads' activity as a
classic “attempt ... to influence legislation by a campaign of publicity,” an
“inevitable” and “incidental” effect of which was “the infliction of some
direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is
directed.” The essential character of such a publicity campaign was, we
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concluded, political, and could not be segregated from the activity's impact
on business. Rather, the plaintiff's cause of action simply embraced the
inherent possibility in such political fights “that one group or the other will
get hurt by the arguments that are made.” Id. at 144. As a political activity,
special factors counseled against regulating the publicity campaign under
the antitrust laws:
“Insofar as [the Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is
a code that condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and, as
we have already pointed out, a publicity campaign to influence
governmental action falls clearly into the category of political
activity. The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the
business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the
political arena. Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution
in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of
political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the
decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this
caution would go for naught if we permitted an extension of the
Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply because
those activities have a commercial impact and involve conduct that
can be termed unethical.”
In Noerr, then, the political context and nature of the activity precluded
inquiry into its antitrust validity.
Here the context and nature of the activity do not counsel against
inquiry into its validity. Unlike the publicity campaign in Noerr, the activity
at issue here did not take place in the open political arena, where
partisanship is the hallmark of decisionmaking, but within the confines of a
private standard-setting process. The validity of conduct within that process
has long been defined and circumscribed by the antitrust laws without
regard to whether the private standards are likely to be adopted into law.
Indeed, because private standard-setting by associations comprising firms
with horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted at all under the
antitrust laws only on the understanding that it will be conducted in a
nonpartisan manner offering procompetitive benefits, see ibid., the
standards of conduct in this context are, at least in some respects, more
rigorous than the standards of conduct prevailing in the partisan political
arena or in the adversarial process of adjudication. The activity at issue here
thus cannot, as in Noerr, be characterized as an activity that has
traditionally been regulated with extreme caution, see Noerr, 365 U.S. at
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141, or as an activity that “bear[s] little if any resemblance to the
combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act.” And petitioner
did not confine itself to efforts to persuade an independent decisionmaker,
cf. Id., at 138, 139 (describing the immunized conduct as “mere
solicitation”); rather, it organized and orchestrated the actual exercise of the
Association's decisionmaking authority in setting a standard. Nor can the
setting of the Association's Code be characterized as merely an exercise of
the power of persuasion, for it in part involves the exercise of market
power. The Association's members, after all, include consumers,
distributors, and manufacturers of electrical conduit, and any agreement to
exclude polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code is in part an implicit
agreement not to trade in that type of electrical conduit. Although one could
reason backwards from the legislative impact of the Code to the conclusion
that the conduct at issue here is “political,” we think that, given the context
and nature of the conduct, it can more aptly be characterized as commercial
activity with a political impact. Just as the antitrust laws should not regulate
political activities “simply because those activities have a commercial
impact,” Id. at 141, so the antitrust laws should not necessarily immunize
what are in essence commercial activities simply because they have a
political impact…..
Thus in this case the context and nature of petitioner's efforts to
influence the Code persuade us that the validity of those efforts must,
despite their political impact, be evaluated under the standards of conduct
set forth by the antitrust laws that govern the private standard-setting
process. The antitrust validity of these efforts is not established, without
more, by petitioner's literal compliance with the rules of the Association, for
the hope of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of
safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being
biased by members with economic interests in restraining competition. An
association cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members
simply by adopting rules that fail to provide such safeguards. The issue of
immunity in this case thus collapses into the issue of antitrust liability.
Although we do not here set forth the rules of antitrust liability governing
the private standard-setting process, we hold that at least where, as here, an
economically interested party exercises decision-making authority in
formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises
market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust
liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in the
marketplace.
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This conclusion does not deprive state and local governments of input
and information from interested individuals or organizations or leave
petitioner without ample means to petition those governments. Petitioner,
and others concerned about the safety or competitive threat of polyvinyl
chloride conduit, can, with full antitrust immunity, engage in concerted
efforts to influence those governments through direct lobbying, publicity
campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression. To the
extent state and local governments are more difficult to persuade through
these other avenues, that no doubt reflects their preference for and
confidence in the nonpartisan consensus process that petitioner has
undermined. Petitioner remains free to take advantage of the forum
provided by the standard-setting process by presenting and vigorously
arguing accurate scientific evidence before a nonpartisan private standardsetting body. And petitioner can avoid the strictures of the private standardsetting process by attempting to influence legislatures through other forums.
What petitioner may not do (without exposing itself to possible antitrust
liability for direct injuries) is bias the process by, as in this case, stacking
the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their
economic interest in restraining competition.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. Private standard setting is often socially beneficial. It can improve
product quality, increase compatibility or interoperability, or reduce costs
by permitting larger output of a common product, thereby creating
economies of scale. Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and
Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 87, 90 (2007) However, private
standard setting can facilitate collusion and exclusion. Collusion most
typically occurs when standards are created or enforced by competing
producers. Exclusion occurs when standards are used to keep some
producers out of the market. These possibilities make it important to
identify circumstances where standards are used anticompetitively.
2. In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961), the Supreme Court sustained a complaint that the defendants, a
group of heater manufacturers, gas utilities, and insurance companies,
excluded the plaintiff’s heater design because it was dangerous. The
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plaintiff alleged that the exclusion was simply a conspiracy to get the
plaintiff’s heater off the market. That might be a perfectly good explanation
why competing heater manufacturers would want to exclude the plaintiff’s
heater. But what must have motivated natural gas utilities and fire
insurance companies, who also allegedly participated in the exclusionary
decision?
3. Today it is widely believed that innovation contributes far more to
economic growth than the simple movement of markets toward greater
competitiveness under constant technology. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow,
Technial Change and the Aggregate Producton Function, 3
REV.ECON.STAT. 312 (1957); Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the
Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J.ECON. 65 (1956); Trevor W. Swan,
Economic Growth and Capital Accumlation, 32 ECON.REC. 334 (1956). If
that it so, then it is also likely that a practice that restrains innovation can do
much more harm to the economy than a practice that simply maintains
prices at higher than the competitive level. Does this mean that antitrust
authorities should be spending relatively more time pursuing innovation
restraints? As the Kloth case, reprinted infra, indicates, problems of proving
causation and harm are significant.
NOTE:
MERGERS AND RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION
The most commonly given reason that the antitrust laws condemn
mergers as anticompetitive is that they threaten higher prices in some
market, either by permitting market wide collusion or by permitting a firm
to raise its own prices “unilaterally” by eliminating a fairly close rival.
Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division
and the Federal Trade Commission in 2010 describe the theories and
techniques that these government agencies will use to challenge mergers as
anticompetitive under the antitrust laws (§ 7 of the Clayton Act, but also
occasionally §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act).
The 2010 Guidelines include a separate section on mergers limiting
“innovation and product variety.” Guidelines, §6.4 which is concerned with
“unilateral effects arising from diminished innovation or reduced product
variety.” As the Guidelines state:
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The [enforcement] Agencies may consider whether a merger is
likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging the
merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that
would prevail in the absence of the merger. That curtailment of
innovation could take the form of reduced incentive to continue
with an existing product-development effort or reduced incentive to
initiate development of new products.
The first of these effects is most likely to occur if at least
one of the merging firms is engaging in efforts to introduce new
products that would capture substantial revenues from the other
merging firm. The second effect, which would be felt over the
longer run, is most likely to occur if at least one of the merging
firms has capabilities that are likely to lead it to develop new
products in the future that would capture substantial revenues from
the other merging firm. The Agencies therefore also consider
whether a merger will diminish innovation competition by
combining two of a very small number of firms with the strongest
capabilities to innovate in a specific direction.
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html
The concern is hardly fanciful and has been known since the beginning
of the twentieth century. For example, in the Paper Bag patent litigation,
which reached the Supreme Court in 1908, the dominant firm had acquired
a patent in a technology that competed with technology it was already
using. It did not use the patent at all, preferring to stick with its existing
technology, but also refused to license it to others and filed a successful
infringement action against a rival firm that developed technology that
infringed the acquired patent. The case is reprinted in Chapter Eight. See
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS.ORG. 3 (2011).
The 2010 Merger Guidelines seem to be giving the nod to the Arrow
side of the Schumpeter-Arrow “debate” over the relationship between
innovation and market structure. Joseph Schumpeter famously argued in
the 1940s that monopolists had a far greater incentive to innovate than
competitors; only monopolists had the resources and they were in bar far
the best position to capture the returns from innovation. Further, dominant
firms typically have a “head start” in innovation that makes it more likely
that they will capture the returns.
See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
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CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942), particularly chapter 7, on
“The Process of Creative Destruction.”
In sharp contrast, Kenneth Arrow argued that greater competition is in
fact more conducive to innovation. Monopolists tend to become heavily
invested in their technology and will willingly innovate along the same
technological path by building on what they have. But outside firms have a
much greater interest in truly innovative technologies that will upend the
dominant firm’s market position. That is, smaller rivals have every
incentive to innovate more radically. Further, the monopolist is already
earning monopoly returns, while small rivals are earning only the
competitive return, so they have much more to gain. Further, a competitor
has everything to lose if a different competitor innovates. See Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 157 (3d ed. 1976) (1962).
See also TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010), which details how over the history of
telecommunications and related technologies most of the truly radical
innovations have come from outsiders who often upended entrenched
dominant firms; see also Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust
Enforcement if Innovation Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (2012)
Today the general consensus is that the truth lies between the two
positions articulated by Schumpeter and Arrow, and that the relationship
between innovation and market structure is an inverted “U” shaped curve.
That is, monopolists have less than optimal incentives to innovate, but so do
the firms in highly competitive markets. Most of the innovation occurs in
markets that are moderately concentrated (say, 4-10 firms). See CHRISTINA
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 1 (2011); Jonathan
Baker, Beyond Schumpeter and Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation,
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 586 (2007). For other arguments that innovation
policy must take antitrust-like considerations more into account, including
evaluations of market structure, see Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously:
Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation Mattered Most, 78 Antitrust L.J. 313
(2012); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation,
2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 637 (2011 Milton Handler Lecture).

In Free FreeHand Corp. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 1171
(N.D.Cal. 2012), the court sustained a complaint that Adobe, a leading
manufacturer of commercial graphic illustration software, acquired a rival's
competing freeware program and then raised the price of its own
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commercial program, while effectively removing the freeware from the
market by ceasing to update it. The plaintiffs alleged that the acquisition
permitted Adobe to raise its own product price while restraining innovation
in the market for graphics design software.
KLOTH V. MICROSOFT CORP.
444 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2006)
Niemeyer, Circuit Judge:
This appeal, a part of the multidistrict class action antitrust litigation
brought against Microsoft Corporation by 39 purchasers of Microsoft's
operating system software and applications software, presents the question
whether 26 indirect purchasers have stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted Microsoft's
motion to dismiss their claims…. The court … found that they lacked
standing to seek recovery for certain types of injury because the alleged
injury did not constitute “antitrust injury,” was speculative, or was
generalized and not specific to the plaintiffs. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs' equitable claims under the doctrine of laches. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
In the aftermath of the United States' suit against Microsoft, in
which Microsoft was found to have maintained an illegal monopoly in the
worldwide market for licensing Intel-compatible PC operating systems, see
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001), numerous
class action suits were filed against Microsoft in courts across the country.
On April 25, 2000, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred
the cases that were pending in federal district courts to the District of
Maryland, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Thereafter, 39 plaintiffs filed a
superseding consolidated amended complaint, seeking damages and
equitable relief under the Clayton and Sherman Acts.
In their 66-page consolidated amended complaint, the plaintiffs
allege that beginning in the late 1980s, when Microsoft's market share in the
United States for operating system software was 95 percent, Microsoft
engaged in a series of predatory acts that were designed to, and did,
eliminate competition and prevent entry into the operating system software
market. They allege that since 1994, when Digital Research, Inc. and IBM
were eliminated as meaningful competitors, Microsoft has had no
significant competitor in the operating systems software market. They assert
that Microsoft used this monopoly power to raise prices and to leverage its
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power into other markets, including markets for applications software such
as word processing, spreadsheet, and office suite software, with the result
that Microsoft has dominated these applications software markets since the
mid-1990s, achieving market shares approaching 90 percent. Thus, for the
time periods material to the complaint, the plaintiffs contend that Microsoft
has had monopoly power in four product markets: (1) The licensing of
Intel-compatible personal computer operating systems software; (2) the
licensing of Intel-compatible personal computer word processing
applications software; (3) the licensing of Intel-compatible personal
computer spreadsheet applications software; and (4) the licensing of Intelcompatible personal computer office suite applications software.
The plaintiffs allege that Microsoft maintained and advanced its
monopoly power by refusing to sell its software to manufacturers, retailers,
and consumers. Instead, they allege, Microsoft employed a two-tier
licensing system. It used one type of license for transactions with “original
equipment manufacturers” (“OEMs”), allowing them to preinstall software
on personal computers, which they in turn sold to consumers or “endusers.” The plaintiffs claim that Microsoft was able to require OEMs to
accept the terms of Microsoft's licensing agreement, forcing the OEMs to
preinstall Microsoft operating systems on personal computers they sell and
to act as Microsoft's agents in offering a second type of license, called “enduser license agreements” (“EULAs”), for acceptance or rejection by
consumers under terms dictated by Microsoft. To use Microsoft software,
the end-users were required to agree to the EULAs, which provided, among
other things, a Microsoft-funded refund to the end-user if the end-user
declined to enter into the EULA. The EULAs imposed significant
restrictions on use of the software by the licensee, giving Microsoft
remedies against the end-user for breach of the license agreement. The
complaint alleges in a similar manner that Microsoft dictated the terms and
conditions under which distributors and retailers were able to sell EULAs.
The plaintiffs claim that under this two-tier licensing regime, most
consumers did not purchase software licenses directly from Microsoft.
Rather, they bought computers from OEMs or retailers with pre-installed
software that incorporated Microsoft's offer to issue the end-user a license
agreement. The 26 plaintiffs who have appealed here are typical of those
who purchased computers from OEMs or retailers with preinstalled
software.
The plaintiffs allege that Microsoft's exclusionary and restrictive
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practices caused them injury by charging them “supra-competitive” prices
for operating systems software and applications software, by denying them
the benefit of new and superior technologies, and by preventing them from
reselling Microsoft software products. They also claim that by integrating
its Internet Explorer web browser with its operating system, Microsoft
deprived them of alternative Internet search engines, degraded the
performance of their computers, and made their computers more susceptible
to security breaches. In short, they allege that as end-users, they paid
“supra-competitive” prices for software and were deprived of the benefits of
competition including, but not limited to, technological innovation, market
choice, product variety, and substitutable supply. They request equitable
relief, treble damages, attorneys fees, and costs….
… the plaintiffs claim that Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer
and Windows caused them direct injury because it resulted in performance
degradation of their computers. This claim either mirrors the assertion that
Microsoft suppressed superior technologies or seeks recovery for injuries
that are not antitrust injuries. If Microsoft developed inferior technology, it
essentially overcharged intermediaries for the value of its products, as
measured by the price it would have obtained in a competitive market. Such
injury is no different in principle from the restrictions on end-user licenses
and the suppression of substitute technologies. All are essentially claims for
illegal overcharges passed on to consumers. And to the extent that
Microsoft's software degraded the performance of plaintiffs' computers,
then any such damage would not form the basis of a claim for antitrust
injury but a claim for some type of product liability injury. Presumably
plaintiffs could make that claim just as they could for any other product
liability claim…..
In addition to claiming injury based on the allegation that Microsoft
charged supra-competitive prices… plaintiffs claim … other types of
injury. They have alleged that (1) they were deprived of the benefits of
competitive technology; (2) they sustained injury from restrictions imposed
in the EULAs prohibiting them from reselling Microsoft software in a
secondary or “used” market; and (3) their computers were degraded by the
integration of the Internet Explorer web browser with the Windows
operating system.
… To have § 4 standing, the plaintiffs must demonstrate direct
antitrust-type injury, not simply any injury that was caused by an antitrust
violation. “Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially
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affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold
damages for injury to his business or property.” Associated General
Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535. To determine whether a person has sustained
direct antitrust-type injury to his business or property, a court must consider
the five factors identified in Associated General Contractors: (1) the causal
connection between an antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiffs, and
whether that harm was intended; (2) whether the harm “was of a type that
Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of
the antitrust laws”; (3) the directness of the alleged injury; (4) “the
existence of more direct victims” of the alleged antitrust injury; and (5)
“problems of identifying damages and apportioning them” among those
directly and indirectly harmed.
When considering the three types of injury that plaintiffs claim to have
sustained directly-injuries other than supra-competitive prices-we conclude,
by applying the Associated General Contractors factors, that plaintiffs'
injuries were too generalized or speculative; that some injuries were not of
the type covered by the antitrust law; that there were more direct victims;
and that plaintiffs' claims raise insuperable problems in measuring and
allocating damages…..
First, with respect to plaintiffs' claims that Microsoft deprived
consumers of competitive technology, we agree with the conclusions
reached by the district court. The court observed, “It would be entirely
speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial proceeding to create in
hindsight a technological universe that never came into existence.” The
court continued, “It would be even more speculative to determine the
relevant benefits and detriments that non-Microsoft products would have
brought to the market and the relative monetary value ... to a diffuse
population of end users.” Id. While plaintiffs assert that they should be
given discovery with respect to these issues, it is readily apparent that
discovery would not change or inform the nature of the alleged injuries. As
the district court stated,
The underlying reason that plaintiffs lack standing is that, to the
extent they are seeking damages ... for the denial of the benefit of
technologically superior products, it is merely coincidental that they
purchased Microsoft products at all. They occupy a position no
different from any other end user of computer products who never
purchased any Microsoft software or EULAs.

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
Hovenkamp

Chapter 6, Page 19
Dec. 2012

At bottom, the harms that the plaintiffs have alleged with respect to the
loss of competitive technologies are so diffuse that they could not possibly
be adequately measured. The problem is not one of discovery and specific
evidence, but of the nature of the injury claimed. Where the purported
injuries amount to generalized or abstract societal harms, the plaintiffs
cannot claim that they, as distinct from others in society, were specifically
injured in their business or property by the alleged antitrust violation, as
required by § 4.
With respect to plaintiffs' alleged injury from Microsoft's restrictions on
end-users in the EULAs, the plaintiffs lack standing because there are more
direct victims-i.e., the retailers and OEMs-and because it is too costly for
courts to discern the allocation of such damages…..
… The plaintiffs also claim that the integration of Windows and the
Internet Explorer web browser resulted in specific harms to their computers
including “loss of speed and memory ... loss of operating system stability
and increased susceptibility to viruses or security breaches.” To the extent
that these claims are for actual injury to plaintiffs' computers, the plaintiffs'
claims amount to claims for defective products. This type of injury is
simply not a type for which plaintiffs can recover under the antitrust law.
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977). Rather, it sounds more in the nature of injury from a breach of
warranty or other product liability. And plaintiffs do not assert that
Microsoft intended to cause this harm to plaintiffs' computers or that
Microsoft's purpose for inflicting this injury was aimed at lessening
competition. As the district court observed, “the degradation of computer
performance alleged by plaintiffs is only incidentally related to the alleged
anti-competitive behavior.” In re Microsoft, 127 F.Supp.2d at 712.
In short, we agree with the district court that … plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that they have sustained direct antitrust-type injury, as required
by § 4 of the Clayton Act and Associated General Contractors.
Finally, we address whether the district court abused its discretion in
dismissing plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief under the doctrine of
laches. See White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he
equitable balancing of a plaintiff's delay with prejudice to a defendant is
primarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we may not
reverse unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an abuse of discretion
”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). In dismissing the
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plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief, the district court concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to pursue their injunctive claims with diligence and that
their failure prejudiced Microsoft. See Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d
125, 127 (4th Cir.1966) (noting that laches may be applied when a plaintiff
fails to pursue his claim with diligence, causing prejudice to the opposing
party).
The plaintiffs argue that they did not pursue their equitable claims
because they were involved in class action settlement proceedings. They
suggest that it would have made no sense to press their claims until those
proceedings were resolved. In addition, the plaintiffs assert that Microsoft
had notice of the nature of their claims for injunctive relief and suffered no
prejudice in the form of “unfair surprise or inability to prepare its defense.”
In response, Microsoft argues that plaintiffs filed only a generalized
claim requesting injunctive relief in 2000 but waited more than four years
before articulating the nature of the injunctive relief that they were seeking.
Microsoft contends that this delay made it impossible for it to coordinate
any consideration of remedies with the litigation in the United States' action
against Microsoft then pending before Judge Kollar-Kotelly in the District
of Columbia District Court. Microsoft argues that if the equitable claims
had not been dismissed, a second round of litigation over the market effects
of the proposed consent decree in the United States' action would have been
required.
Accepting Microsoft's arguments, the district court stated that it was
“perfectly clear ... that the plaintiffs in the consolidated amended complaint
were not pursuing injunctive claims with diligence. The focus was on
monetary damages.” The court also relied on the fact that the inability to
coordinate with the United States' action caused prejudice because the
simultaneous proceedings would have “reshape[d] the competitive
landscape.” Finally, the court noted that despite years of litigation, the
plaintiffs had only recently specified the nature of their request for equitable
relief and that they were using the initial “vague claim” for equitable relief
as “a vessel for, essentially, asserting new claims.” Permitting that result
would, in the district court's judgment, be “contrary to the public interest.”
In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of laches to dismiss
plaintiffs' equitable claims.
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AFFIRMED.
NOTES AND QUESTIONS
1. As the Kloth decision suggests, when the plaintiff’s alleged harm
includes foreclosure of nascent products or technologies it is almost
impossible for the plaintiff to show that the new product or technology
would have come to fruition and would have been commercially successful
but for the restraint. This makes proof of causation, harm, and damages
extremely difficult. By contrast, as the preceding Allied Tube decision
suggests, this standard is much more easily satisfied if the product has
already been developed and is ready to be marketed. For this reason and
many others, antitrust often falls short of optimal protection for consumers.
See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63
VAND.L.REV. 675 (2010).
2. In the 1960s the Government brought an antitrust action alleging that the
major automobile manufacturers in the United States had conspired with
each other to slow down investment in the development of air pollution
control equipment for automobiles. Specifically, the government claimed
that the defendants conspired “to eliminate competition in the research,
development, manufacture and installation of motor vehicle air pollution
control equipment, and in the purchase from others of patents and patent
rights, covering such equipment.” The case ended in a consent decree, to
which a number of local governments rigorously objected. As the County
of Los Angeles wrote:

The County of Los Angeles and the [California] Air Pollution
Control District have been actively engaged in the control of air
pollution for over two decades. The Air Pollution Control Law of
1947 adopted by the California Legislature recognized and used
throughout the nation as a model for effective air pollution control
regulations….
Los Angeles County, with its low wind velocities and
frequent temperature inversions, is especially susceptible to air
pollution. Emissions of air contaminants from stationery sources are
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strictly controlled by law; but each day motor vehicles discharge
12,000 tons of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen,
and other contaminants into the air of the Los Angeles Basin.
The fact that emissions from motor vehicles pollute the air
has been known for many years. In the early 1950's the automobile
was clearly identified by scientists as the primary cause of the
typical Los Angeles photochemical “smog.”
These matters were known to the automobile manufacturers,
and County officials regularly informed them and communicated
with them. The manufacturers neither recognized that they had any
responsibility for developing air pollution control devices nor did
they make any substantial effort to develop them.
In 1953, the manufacturers entered into the agreements
which constituted the alleged combination in restraint of trade. In
1955 the cross-licensing and “most favored purchaser” agreements
were made. No devices were produced….
Amicus Brief of the County of Los Angeles, United States v. Auto. Mfgs.
Ass’n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. City
of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
However, the restraint involved equipment that was never
developed. Subsequent private actions ran aground for largely the same
reasons as given in the principal case. See In re Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Equip., 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Ford
Motor Co. v. Lane, 86 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (denying antitrust
standing on plaintiff’s claim that Ford had the capacity to build more
efficient, lower emission vehicles but failed to do so as a result of a
conspiracy with other automakers; in denying standing, court concluded
that plaintiff’s true injury resulted from the fact that he had to purchase
more gasoline than he would have had to purchase if his engine had been
more efficient, and that Ford did not operate in the gasoline market). Cf.
Ass’n of Washington Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, 241 F.3d 696 (9th
Cir. 2001) (hospitals lacked standing to sue cigarette companies on claim
that latter conspired to restrain development of safer cigarettes).

